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Abstract
A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable
prize(s). Sabotage is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rivals likelihood of winning
the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, political
or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model and various perspectives on such
sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests.
We discuss the theories and evidence highlighting the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs,
and the e¤ects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, along with possible
mechanisms to reduce sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest
player, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive e¤ort exerted by the players, and sabotage
may lessen the e¤ectiveness of public policies, such as a¢ rmative action, or information revela-
tion in contests. We discuss various policies that a designer may employ to counteract sabotage
activities. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research.
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The king may be threatened by dangers in the interior or in the remote regions, par-
ticularly when he is about to start on an expedition. An internal rebellion is one led
by a Crown Prince, the Purohita (the priest), the chief of defence or a minister. . . .
An internal rebellion is more dangerous than one in the outer regions because it is like
nurturing a viper in ones bosom.
- Kautilya, Artha Shastra [Economic Science], c. 4th Century BC, p. 160.
1 Introduction
Sabotage is ubiquitous in everyday life. A very early mention of sabotage was by Kautilya, the
Prime Minister of Chandragupta Maurya (the rst King of the Maurya Kingdom in ancient India) in
400 BC. The Cambridge Dictionary denes sabotage as to damage or destroy equipment, weapons
or buildings in order to prevent the success of an enemy or competitor. In the context of labor
economics, Lazear (1989, p. 563) denes sabotage as "any (costly) actions that one worker takes
that adversely a¤ect the output of another". Although the concept of sabotage is quite familiar, the
day-to-day denitions and understandings of sabotage vary across contexts, places and times. In the
industrial organization literature, sabotage is connected with the act of raising rivals cost(Salop
and Sche¤man 1983). The early literature on labor issues considers sabotage to be the intentional
employment of lower level e¢ ciency by laborers in response to lower wages o¤ered (Pouget 1912).1
In each of these cases, individuals employ strategies that are intended to damage someone elses
success rather than of improving their own. Sabotage has a similar connotation in contests. A
deliberate and costly act by one player to damage the performance of another in a contest is, in
general, termed sabotage. In the current study, we review the economics literature on sabotage
from the perspective of contests.
Formally, contests are situations in which players expend costly resources to win a valuable
prize and, irrespective of the outcome, all of the resources expended become sunk. Examples of
1Veblen (1921, p. 38) denes sabotage as the conscientious withdrawal of e¢ ciency.
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such situations include sports, lobbying, job interviews, promotion tournaments, research funding
applications, legal disputes, war, patent races, and advertising. In each of these circumstances,
players have the opportunity to expend resources to improve their own probability of winning the
prize. Often, they also have the opportunity to expend resources to reduce another contestants
probability of winning the same prize. Following a major part of the literature, we term the
resources expended to increase ones own probability of winning as e¤ort, and those expended
to reduce rivalsprobability of winning as sabotage. Because the playerswinning probabilities
always sum to 1, sabotage indirectly improves ones likelihood of winning the prize.2 However,
this type of behavior often violates social norms and is illegal and costly making sabotage an
expensive strategy. Despite this, such behavior is widespread, as the following examples indicate:
 The steady decline of Microsoft since 2000 under CEO Steve Ballmer is attributed partly to
the new employee review system introduced by him (Oremus 2013). In this system, employees
are evaluated relative to each other, top performers receive bonuses and promotions, whereas
those at the bottom often have to fear for their jobs. The review system encourages employees
to do almost everything they can to improve their ranking relative to their peers. For instance,
a Microsoft engineer reported that "people responsible for features will openly sabotage other
peoples e¤orts." Sabotage was undertaken subtly by withholding information from colleagues
to ensure that they did not get ahead in the rankings.
 Businesspeople often resort to costly strategies that are employed for the purpose of damaging
the competitorsbusiness. Friedman (1998, p. 577) describes such a business malpractice that
occurred in the 1890s. John H. Patterson, the owner of the National Cash Register Company,
elded a special type of a counterproductive salesman. They were not required to promote
their own product; instead, their job was to follow the salesmen of rival rms from shop to
shop and to convince the customers to cancel any order that had just been placed. In this
way, the market remained open for Patterson to sell his own cash registers in the near future.
2Here, we do not consider the cases in which there might be a tie or no winner is selected. The intuition behind
sabotage, however, remains the same for such cases.
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 In many marketing campaigns, rms stress their rivalsweak points. One such example is
Progressos famous advertisements, which highlighted that its rival Campbells o¤ered 95
soups containing monosodium glutamate (MSG). This led to a 4%-5% decline in Campbells
US soup sales (Lubin 2011).
 Sabotage is common also in political campaigns in which the opponents are discredited and
often denigrated. In the 1997 general election cycle, the UKs Conservative Party broadcast
an ad with a picture of then-Labor Party leader Tony Blair, replacing his eyes in the picture
with demonic ones.
 Political imprisonment can be seen as an extreme form of such sabotage in political contests.
As an example, consider Aung San Suu Kyi, who was placed under house arrest in 1990 when
her National League for Democracy received 59% of the votes in the Burmese general election.
 Stealing crucial information from a political or commercial rival is also not uncommon. One
such example is the set of events that led to the Watergate scandalin 1972. US President
Nixon and the Committee for the Re-Election of the President designed a plan that involved,
among other illegal activities, breaking into the Democratic National Committee headquarters
at the Watergate complex to collect information that could be used against the Democratic
Party in the election.
 Scorched earthis a famous strategy in warfare and corporate takeover battles. In warfare,
it involves troops burning any land, crops, or trees as they retreat so there are no supplies
available to the advancing enemy army. In corporate takeover battles, the strategy describes
actions that a rm undertakes to make the proposed takeover unattractive to the acquiring
rm, such as liquidating its valuable and desirable assets and assuming new debt obligations.
 Female satin bowerbirds view bowers, i.e., decorated nests, as indicators of male quality in
mate choice. As a consequence, male satin bowerbirds often destroy the bowers of other males
to gain an advantage in sexual competition (Borgia 1985).
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All of these examples, although in various di¤erent contexts, convey essentially the same mes-
sage. However, because these examples often resemble other seemingly similar contest-driven be-
haviors, it is important to distinguish acts of sabotage from behaviors such as punishment(Abbink
et al. 2010), nastiness(Zizzo and Oswald 2001; Abbink and Sadrieh 2009), risk taking(Genakos
and Pagliero 2012), and cheating(Preston and Szymanski 2003). The main di¤erence comes from
the fact that sabotage acts are carried out to damage others and are driven by the material benets
for the saboteur.
When an agent punishes someone else, this typically happens either because the person being
punished is not following an objective norm or because the agent is motivated by fairness issues.
Unlike sabotage, the punishment oftentimes is not executed in expectation of a material benet
for the punisher. It is to be noted, however, that when a norm is subjective, a powerful agent
may distort the norm in his or her own favor, making punishment and sabotage indistinguishable.
This is what happened when the military junta in power punishedSuu Kyi with imprisonment.
However, in the end, it was an act of sabotage.
Agents who possess features of nastiness as in the joy of destruction (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009)
or in money-burning (Zizzo and Oswald 2001) games may execute strategies similar to those of
a saboteur. However, although there might be intrinsic motivation for being nasty, employing that
strategy does not necessarily produce a material benet for the agent. Instead, sabotage behavior
is motivated by the expected material benet arising from raising the incremental probability of
winning.
Similarly, an agents risky behavior may or may not involve other agents, especially competitors.
Although engaging in sabotage itself may be risky, to employ sabotage there needs to be a victim
of sabotage, which is not a pre-condition for risky behavior.
The distinction from cheating, however, is not that clear. Oftentimes, an agent involved in
cheating does so to illegally distort his own performance in a contest. A sabotaging agent tries
(legally or illegally) to damage the performance of his rivals. Preston and Szymanski (2003) analyze
several forms of cheating in sports and mention that those cheating activities, such as taking illegal
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performance enhancing drugs, doping racehorses and intentional poor performance in a basketball
game, are not sabotage. There are, however, other cheating acts that are inseparable from the act
of sabotage. When an agent illegally damages the opponent, then it becomes both cheating and
sabotage. One such example comes from boxing. In a 1962 heavyweight title ght, it is claimed
that Sonny Liston applied a banned substance to the surface of his gloves that caused irritation to
the eyes of the opponent Muhammad Ali (then known as Cassius Clay). The use of such an illegal
substance was cheating, but because it hindered Alis performance, it also was an act of sabotage.3
Because sabotage is common, important as well as di¤erent from other similar acts, a stream of
research has investigated the means and consequences of sabotage. However, there is no comprehen-
sive survey of the existing studies. Partial reviews of sabotage behavior, as parts of longer reviews,
are provided by Konrad (2009, Chapter 5.3), on the theoretical literature, and by Dechenaux et
al. (2012, Chapter 6.1), on the experimental literature. In addition, Amegashie (2015) recently
provided a brief overview of sabotage in rent-seeking contests. In this study, we thoroughly review
the economics literature of sabotage in contests, both in theoretical and applied terms. We cover
the economics literature but do not consider literature from other areas of research, such as or-
ganizational behavior or political science, even though they might be related in terms of broader
appeal.
The remainder of this survey is arranged as follows. In the next section, we provide a general
specication of contests without sabotage and then introduce sabotage into this framework. Next,
we discuss the consequences and welfare e¤ects of agents engaging in sabotage, for the contest
organizer and for third parties. Saboteurs may be discouraged in two main ways: reducing the
benets of sabotage or increasing its costs. We discuss these issues in detail and introduce examples.
We conclude by pointing out the possible research contributions that are yet to be made.
3We thank Atsu Amegashie for providing us with the example.
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2 Contests without sabotage
From a game-theory perspective, a majority of contests are two-stage games. In the rst stage,
the contest organizer sets the rules of the game, such as the structure of prizes, participation
costs, number of contestants, and so on. The contestants observe these rules and choose their
competitive activities in the games second stage.4 The early contest literature (e.g., Tullock 1980
on rent-seeking; Lazear and Rosen 1981 on tournaments; Hillman and Samet 1987; Hillman and
Riley 1989; and Baye et al. 1996 on all-pay auctions) assumes that competitive actions are one-
dimensional and a¤ect the own outputor performancein the contest positively. The allocation
of prizes among contestants depends on all of the contestantsperformances and, hence, on the
contestants actions. Typically, better performance relative to others makes a contestant more
likely to receive a larger prize.
To formalize these arguments, suppose there are N risk-neutral contestants indexed by i 2
f1; :::; Ng. Each contestant chooses an action or e¤ortei. To simplify the exposition, we follow
the path of most theoretical contest papers. We assume that there is a single prize for the winner
that is valued at w1i by contestant i, and N  1 identical (and lower valued) prizes for losers valued
at w2i by contestant i. We dene the prize spread as wi := w1i   w2i. Contestant i receives
the winners prize with probability pi = pi (e) 2 [0; 1], where e = (e1; :::; eN ) denotes the vector of
contestantse¤orts and
P
i pi = 1. pi, often termed a contest success functionin the literature,
which is non-decreasing in ei, and non-increasing in e i = (e1; :::; ei 1; ei+1; :::; eN ). Contestant i
chooses his action to maximize his expected payo¤
i = w2i + pi (e) wi   ci (ei) ; (1)
where ci (ei) is the cost of his action. Stronger action (i.e., more e¤ort) is assumed to be more
costly; thus c0i > 0.
4 In some applications, such as war, no contest designer exists. In some other cases, such parameters are beyond the
contest organizers control. When parties lobby for a government license, for instance, the winners prize is the prot
that can earned by being awarded the license. In both of these situations, the game consists of only one (namely, the
second) stage.
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In many applications, no between-contestant asymmetry in prize valuations is assumed, i.e.,
w1i = w1 and w2i = w2, and, as a result, wi = w for all i. For most of the following, we will
adopt the same assumption, while noting any exceptions.
From (1), it is easy to see that a contestant faces a simple tradeo¤ when deciding his optimal
e¤ort. By exerting more e¤ort, he can increase his probability of receiving the winners prize.
However, he also increases the cost associated with the e¤ort. The optimal e¤ort depends on the
contest design chosen in the rst stage. The prize spread, for example, a¤ects a contestants gain
from outperforming his rivals and thus his optimal e¤ort. In many applications, it is assumed that
the organizer receives some payo¤, which depends on the vector of e¤orts, while he has to pay
the contests prizes. Thus, he may wish to design the contest in such a way as to maximize the
di¤erence between the payo¤ and the sum of contest prizes.
3 Rationale behind sabotage in contests
As indicated before, the allocation of prizes in contests typically depends on the contestantsrelative
performances. Therefore, the probability of receiving the winner prize could be increased either by
boosting own performance (e.g., by choosing to exert more e¤ort, as argued in the preceding sec-
tion) or by damaging the performances of other contestants. If such destructive behavior is feasible,
competitive activities are N -dimensional and given by (ei; si) with sij (j = 1; :::; N , j 6= i) being the
action that player i takes to reduce player js performance and si = (si1; :::; sii 1; sii+1; :::; siN ).5
In turn, the probability of receiving the winners prize would have to be restated as pi (e; s),
with s = (s1; :::; sN ). This probability is non-decreasing in si, but non-increasing in s i =
(s1i; :::; si 1i; si+1i; :::; sNi). Dye (1984) and Lazear (1989) are the rst economists to account for
such destructive behavior in contests. They denote the actions sij as sabotage directed by player
i against player j. Again, it is typically assumed that performing these actions is costly. Among
5This specication excludes the term sii, i.e., the possibility of sabotaging oneself. Although self sabotagemay
seem improbable, Gürtler and Münster (2013) show that it is rational for a player in some special circumstances to
sabotage himself. We discuss this issue again in Section 4.1.
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its other components, those costs may contain punishment for detected sabotage, costs of hiding
sabotage acts, and e¤ort expended in implementing sabotage. Thus, the total costs now amount
to ci = ci (ei; si).6 Taking these arguments into account, the payo¤ function in (1), specied in the
preceding section, changes to
i = w2 + pi (e; s) w   ci (ei; si) : (2)
When deciding about sabotage activities, a player faces a tradeo¤ similar to the one associated
with productive e¤orts. By sabotaging his opponents, the player increases his probability of winning
but also his own costs. Therefore, the theoretical prediction is that players may well nd it in their
interest to sabotage others.7
Whether people in the eld behave in line with this prediction can be answered only by looking
at data on behavior in contests. Unfortunately, sabotage activities rarely are recorded, so that eld
studies of sabotage (except in sports) basically are absent. An early exception is the paper by Drago
and Garvey (1998). They conduct a survey of Australian employees and nd that employees tend
to help each other less if their own compensation depends on relative performance. As sabotage
can be understood as the opposite of help (because sabotage reduces another players performance,
whereas help increases it), their ndings imply that sabotage is empirically relevant. This conclusion
is conrmed by numerous laboratory experiments (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011;
Harbring et al. 2007; Falk et al. 2008; Vandegrift and Yavas 2010; Carpenter et al. 2010; and
Gürtler et al. 2011), and eld studies from sports (Balafoutas et al. 2012; Brown and Chowdhury
2014; and Deutscher et al. 2013).
6Beviá and Corchón (2006) is an exception. They assume that players share the aggregate output they produce
and that their shares depend on the relative contributions to total output. By sabotaging the other players, a player
increases his relative contribution, while at the same time total output declines. Hence, sabotage can generate an
indirect as well as a direct cost.
7Standard procedures exist to show the existence of equilibria and to characterize them, given specic forms of
the CSF and the cost function. We describe some in detail in Section 5. In addition, it is easy to see that contestants
are more inclined to sabotage others if the probability of winning the prize is very sensitive to sabotage e¤orts. We
revisit this issue also in Section 5.
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4 Welfare e¤ects of sabotage
The examples stated in the Introduction o¤er anecdotal evidence of sabotage, and the studies cited
in the previous section establish that sabotage is empirically relevant as well. These observations
prompt the investigation of the e¤ects of sabotage on a contests outcome, especially its welfare
implications. The act of sabotage has several consequences, but it in general a¤ects welfare ad-
versely. It is easy to observe that the resources expended on sabotage behavior are unproductive and
hence wasteful. Additionally, by denition, sabotage activities are aimed at reducing rivalspro-
ductive performances, thereby destroying valuable output. While these consequences of sabotage
are either a direct implication of our model or evident without further explanation, the remaining
consequences deserve further elaboration.
The anticipation of being sabotaged produces a discouragement e¤ect, according to which the
players lower their productive e¤orts. In extreme cases, sabotage may lead to an adverse selection
of contestants in the sense that the best possible participants might abstain from participating
altogether. In Subsection 4.1, we rst determine who su¤ers the most from sabotage and then
investigate the e¤ects of sabotage on welfare. We consider several other perspectives on the e¤ects
of sabotage. Sabotage may prevent the contest organizer from allowing proper information ow.
If a¢ rmative action policies increase sabotage, the organizer may be apprehensive in employing
such policies. Agents who do not actively participate in the contest, such as spectators in sports
contests or voters in an election, also can be adversely a¤ected if sabotage is present. We discuss
such issues in Subsection 4.2. Finally, in Subsection 4.3, we briey address the welfare e¤ects of
sabotage when regular e¤orts are themselves unproductive, such as in rent-seeking contests.
4.1 Victims of sabotage and related consequences
Many studies of sabotage in contests either consider situations with two contestants or focus on
symmetric equilibria in which all players are subject to the same amount of sabotage. However, if
a player faces at least two opponents, he may decide to reduce one players output more strongly
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than another ones. In those circumstances, the question that arises is the following: Which player
is subject to the most sabotage?
One aspect of this question is the possibility of heterogeneity among contestants. A contestant
would be indi¤erent to sabotaging di¤erent rivals if they were homogenous.8 Heterogeneity may
either occur ex ante, i.e., contestants may inherently be di¤erent in terms of e¢ ciency, or it may
occur ex post, i.e., in a multi-stage contest, one (ex-ante homogenous) contestant might perform
better in the early rounds than his rivals. Ex-ante heterogeneity, under risk neutrality, can easily
be captured by heterogeneity in prize values. If wi > wj ; then it can be said that contestant i
is more e¢ cient than contestant j.
Determining optimal shooting strategies in truels (shooting contests between three players),
Shubik (1954) already indicated that the best shooter may not necessarily survive the truel with
the highest probability. This is because the other two players may focus their attention on the best
shooter to eliminate him early from the contest. A similar logic has been proven to be true in the
context of sabotage. In contests with at least three players, very able players are often sabotaged
more heavily because they present the greater danger.9
To capture this argument formally, we put some additional structure on pi. Suppose that each
contestants performance is denoted by yi, which is a function of ei and s i. Assume further that
contestant i receives the top prize if and only if his performance is better than all other contestants.
Then, pi can be restated as pi = P (yi > max fy1; :::; yi 1; yi+1; :::; yNg), where P () denotes the
probability operator. Suppose that contestant i believes that contestant j is so able that j will beat
all of is other opponents or, in other words max fy1; :::; yi 1; yi+1; :::; yNg = yj . Then, pi simplies
to pi = P (yi > yj), and i nds it optimal to sabotage contestant j only (because
@pi(e
;s)
@sik
= 0 for
8Of course, the contestant may nd it optimal to sabotage more than one rival, in which case typically he would
sabotage homogenous rivals equally. The decision to sabotage one or multiple rivals depends, among other things,
on whether there are increasing or diminishing returns to sabotaging a single rival.
9See, for instance, Skaperdas and Grofman (1995), Chen (2003), Yumoto (2003), Münster (2007) or Gürtler and
Münster (2010). Regarding the example of the Satin bowerbirds in the introduction, it is observed that bowers
articially decorated with exaggerated numbers of berries are subject to more destruction (Madden 2001).
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all k = 1; :::; N; k 6= i; j), if he wants to sabotage anyone at all.10
The consequences of sabotage for the contests organizer can be disastrous. Talented players
may not want to participate in the contest at all if they anticipate sabotage (Münster 2007). The
contests organizer may thus be stuck with mediocre contestants. This type of adverse selection is
particularly detrimental if the e¤orts exerted by the best players are pivotal in determining social
welfare. Examples of such incidences are patent races or innovation tournaments with spillovers. In
those situations, the greatest e¤ort usually is correlated with a better quality product or process,
and the act of sabotage may potentially degrade that quality.
Another consequence of the threat of sabotage is that in the early rounds of dynamic contests,
players may not want to put forth much productive e¤ort to avoid gaining a lead and thereby
becoming the victim of sabotage in later rounds (Gürtler and Münster 2010). Gürtler and Münster
(2013) obtain an even stronger result. They assume that contestants su¤er psychologically from
being sabotaged by others. Consequently, the contestants may decide to help others in the early
rounds of a dynamic tournament or even engage in self-sabotage so as not to be targeted by
the sabotage e¤orts of others in later rounds. Hence, the problem of sabotage may lead to an
additional problem of demotivation. It is to be noted, however, that the results hold only if none
of the competitors is beyond the reach of the other competitors before the nal period begins.
Otherwise, the winner of the tournament would be known before the start of the nal round and
sabotaging others would no longer make sense.
These theoretical ndings are well supported by experimental studies. Gürtler et al. (2013)
conduct experiments on dynamic three-person contests and nd that players with a lead at the
beginning of the nal round are sabotaged more heavily than players who are not in a leading
position. They also conrm that the prospect of being sabotaged at a later stage of the game
reduces the incentive to work productively early on. A similar observation is made by Carpenter
10Beviá and Corchón (2006) investigate whether agents decide to sabotage others at all (i.e., whether the equilibrium
is interior). In line with the above arguments, they show that if an agent is unwilling to sabotage another agent of
some specic ability, he also does not sabotage any other agent of lesser ability.
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et al. (2010). In the experiment of Carpenter et al. (2010), a competitors opponents evaluate
his performance subjectively. Players can sabotage other players by underreporting those players
performances. Carpenter et al. (2010) nd that subjects indeed underreport rivalsperformances,
and this has a negative e¤ect on incentives.
An interesting result is derived by Deutscher et al. (2013). In a theoretical model, they nd that
the more able contestants are sabotaged to a greater extent even in static two-player contests. The
result depends on the assumption that the more able contestants have higher returns to productive
e¤ort, and productivity and sabotage are substitutes for each other. Because of the rst assumption,
less able contestants exert less productive e¤ort, which, together with the second assumption,
implies more sabotage. The authors test their predictions using data from German professional
soccer matches and obtain results in line with their theoretical ndings.11 Vandegrift and Yavas
(2010) conduct laboratory experiments studying two-person contests and nd that better players
are sabotaged more vigorously.
However, it is also theoretically possible that the best players are not sabotaged as much or as
often and the stated problems do not materialize. Gürtler and Münster (2010) show that players
may want to sabotage weak players in the early rounds of dynamic contests to eliminate them
from the competition. Amegashie and Runkel (2007) consider a four-person (and thus two-stage)
elimination contest. They nd that the most able player may decide to help the weaker player (and
thus sabotage the stronger player) in the other seminal, whereas all other players only take actions
that a¤ect the outcome of their own seminal. Finally, Gürtler (2008) considers a contest between
two teams. He shows that it may be optimal to direct all sabotage activities against the weakest
member of the opponent team. If team production is characterized by decreasing returns to e¤ort
and complementarities exist between individual e¤orts, this type of sabotage strategy reduces the
opponent teams output most e¤ectively.
11See also Ishida (2012) and Balafoutas et al. (2012). In a model with private abilities, Ishida (2012) nds that
very able players who signal their ability early on are sabotaged more in two-player contests. Balafoutas et al. (2012)
analyze data from judo matches and nd that higher ranked players are sabotaged more often.
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Balafoutas et al. (2012) and Dato and Nieken (2014) investigate the personal characteristics of
contestants who are likely to be sabotaged. Balafoutas et al. (2012) analyze the interactions be-
tween ability and gender in sabotage decisions in judo world championships. Destructive strategies
in judo, called Shido, are "intended to hinder the opponents attack" and are penalized if "judged
to be against the rules of the game".12 Balafoutas et al. (2012) classify Shidoas sabotage and
nd that it is used more by players with lower world rankings and is used more against players
with higher world ranking. However, no signicant di¤erence was found in sabotage behavior by
gender. Instead of studying the e¤ect of ability on sabotage, Dato and Nieken (2014) specically
investigate whether gender di¤erences exist in sabotage behavior. In a real-e¤ort experiment, they
observe that men sabotage their opponents more than women do. In turn, in a mixed tournament
between men and women, women are sabotaged more than men. Therefore, while men are more
likely to win the tournament, they also incur higher sabotage costs. These two e¤ects more or less
even out, and the expected payo¤s are similar for men and women.
4.2 Other welfare e¤ects of sabotage
As we elaborate in this subsection, sabotage may also a¤ect welfare by reducing the benets from
specic policies, such as performance feedback and a¢ rmative action, as well as by reducing the
utility of third parties not actively participating in the contest. Charness et al. (2014) run a
between-subject laboratory experiment to understand the possible e¤ect of sabotage in situations
wherein subjects receive a xed (i.e., performance-independent) wage. In di¤erent treatments, the
subjects are required to perform a task requiring real e¤ort. In one treatment, participants were
not given any feedback about their relative performances, whereas in another treatment, they were
so informed. In an additional treatment with feedback, subjects had the opportunity to expend
resources to impair the performances of other participants (and hence to improve their relative
12Because Shidois employed to reduce the e¤ectiveness of the opponents productive activity and is costly (owing
to the possible penalty), by denition it is sabotage. Similarly, in soccer a foul(Corral et al. 2010; Deutscher et al.
2013) and in horseracing an intervention(Brown and Chowdhury 2014) are regarded as acts of sabotage.
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ranking). It is found that although no explicit incentive to exert any productive e¤ort existed,
subjects actually expended e¤ort in all treatments. Providing feedback improves performance
signicantly. However, when the subjects have the opportunity to sabotage each other, the nal
outcome is characterized by signicantly less e¤ort than in the treatment with feedback, but with
no sabotage. This happens for two reasons: rst, the subjectsperformance is reduced by sabotage,
and second, anticipating sabotage, the subjects exert less e¤ort.
A¢ rmative action, such as handicapping some players or providing others with head starts are
often employed in various contests to help contestants from disadvantaged groups.In our notation,
a¢ rmative action manipulates the function pi (e; s), increasing a disadvantaged players chances of
winning and thereby inducing him to exert greater e¤ort.13 However, di¤erentially favorable treat-
ment of some subjects may also cause more sabotage, o¤setting any welfare gains from a¢ rmative
action. Brown and Chowdhury (2014) consider a contest in which the designer utilizes policy tools
to level the playing eld for the contestants. They use data from the British Horse Racing Associ-
ation. In a standard horse race, every horse is required to carry a minimum amount of weight. In
handicapped races that aim to make the contestants more even, higher-ranked horses carry more
weight than other horses. The authors show that the handicap works in the right direction, in the
sense that it reduces the likelihood of the highest-ranked horse winning. The authors then include
the possibility of sabotage. Often, a jockey intentionally bumps his horse into another one, impedes
the paths of other horses on the track, or runs his horse dangerously to reduce the likelihood of
other horses winning. Classifying these incidents as sabotage, the authors nd that handicapping
increases the likelihood of sabotage. Brown and Chowdhury (2014) conclude that handicaps, head
starts or any other a¢ rmative action policy tool meant to level the playing eld should be used
with caution because they can initiate and escalate sabotage behavior.
These studies illustrate that the existence of sabotage may make policies such as a¢ rmative
13Brown (2011) shows that di¤erences in ability might discourage less skilled players and thus lessen the overall
e¤ort exerted in the contest. To address this issue, contest designers often handicap the more able players or give
head starts to the players with lesser ability, such as, e.g., helping historically disadvantaged demographic groups in
college admissions, the labor market and on-the-job promotions.
15
action and information disclosure less e¤ective. However, given the possibility of sabotage, whether
total welfare is higher with the policies (compared to when the policies are not in place) is not
clear.
It is also conceivable that sabotage a¤ects agents who do not actively participate in the contest.
Sabotage often is argued not only to be illegal, but also unethical and immoral. Baumol (1992)
considers an innovation race in which one rm can sabotage the R&D e¤orts of a rival. This not
only reduces the prot of the rival, but potentially also the social welfare gains stemming from the
innovation and related positive externalities. Preston and Szymanski (2003) argue that because the
results in most sport contests depend on relative performance, sabotage may be an e¤ective way
to outdo others, especially with a small number of players. However, sabotage may also reduce the
attractiveness and productivity of the contest, thereby lowering ones expected return and leaving
the overall e¤ect ambiguous.
Balafoutas et al. (2012) show that sabotage indeed reduces the utility of spectators in a sporting
match. A survey of spectators in the judo world championship shows that an increase in fouls
reduced the spectatorsutility obtained from watching the match. One should consider, however,
that the spectatorsdisutility from increases in destructive e¤ort and the disutility from decreases
in productive e¤ort (owing to more sabotage) may be correlated. Whether the e¤ect of destructive
e¤ort is signicant, apart from the trickle downe¤ect of less productive e¤ort, is an empirical
question; Balafoutas et al. (2012) do not try to answer this question.
This third-party e¤ect is prevalent in electoral contests in which it is possible for political parties
to resort to counterproductive acts such as vote rigging, vote snatching, and political violence, to
gain power or to prevent the oppositions supporters voters from voting. In a political economy
framework, Chaturvedi (2005) shows that the party with less political support indeed will engage
in more sabotage, which may diminish the general populations condence in democratic processes,
including that of voters and non-voters alike.
In a similar vein, it can be hypothesized that negative campaigning in markets or in elections
may reduce the utilities of consumers and voters. We found no academic research in economics
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that investigates the e¤ects of negative product advertising on consumer welfare. In contrast, both
theoretical and empirical studies document the e¤ects of negative political campaigns on voters.
Regarding the e¤ect of negative campaigning on voter turnout, the demobilization hypothesis states
that negative campaigns depress voter turnout, whereas the stimulation hypothesis suggests that
exposure to negative campaigns may even increase votersprobability of voting. The eld results,
however, are inconclusive.
Soubeyran (2009) shows that sabotage may a¤ect voters negatively, resulting in lower voter
turnouts. He proposes a theoretical model of contest with attacks and defenses. In this model,
two candidates choose between enhancing their own image (defense) and sabotaging the opponents
(attack). Soubeyran (2009) concludes that the e¤ect of a negative advertising campaign on voter
turnout depends on voter sensitivity to messages that attack a candidates opponents. More specif-
ically, when voter sensitivity to attack increases, candidates attack more, but the relation between
attack and voter turnout may be non-monotonic. The empirical evidences are mixed. Ansolabehere
et al. (1994) nd that exposure to negative advertisements reduces intentions to vote. Freedman
and Goldstein (1999),on the other hand, obtain data on the frequency of an advertisement being
aired and on viewership to derive an estimate of advertisement exposure. They nd that exposure
to negative campaign advertisements appears to increase the probability of voting. Inconclusive re-
sults are found when they use a di¤erent measure of individual perceptions of the tones of campaign
advertisements.
One nal, relatively unexplored aspect of the negative welfare e¤ects of sabotage is the costly
investments undertaken to counteract sabotage by ones opponents. This may include defensive
e¤orts to prevent sabotage in the rst place, such as investment in security measures to prevent the
theft of information since the Watergate scandal, as discussed in the Introduction, or a nations
investment in counterterrorism measures. These defense-against-sabotage costs are welfare-reducing
because they are unproductive. Gordon et al. (2005), reporting to the FBI, show that US rms
spend 8% to 24% of their IT budgets on data security measures, whereas state governments may
spend up to $350 per employee annually to protect against potential threats. Hence, although
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it has not been investigated thoroughly, the welfare e¤ects of sabotage in this dimension can be
signicant.
4.3 Welfare e¤ects of sabotage when subjectse¤orts are unproductive
Up to this point, we assumed that e¤orts expended by contest participants are productive and
that the tournament organizer thus wishes to induce high e¤ort (as in business organizations and
in sports). In some applications, such as rent seeking or conict, however, players e¤orts are
themselves directly unproductive. In rent seeking contests, e¤ort is aimed only at obtaining a
larger share of an existing rent and thus represents a complete waste of resources (Tullock 1967,
1980; Bhagwati 1982). In such situations, some of the previous welfare implications are reversed
and sabotage may even be benecial from that perspective. The intuition is that the prospect
of being sabotaged may reduce the motivations of contestants to exert e¤ort, as argued in the
literature (Gürtler and Münster 2010; Amegashie 2012), which would lead to a welfare gain. Two
examples illustrate this point.
1. Consider a rm in which several employees compete for promotion. In many instances, the
promotion decision is made by the employeessuperior. Therefore, employees may work extremely
hard to impress the superior with their outstanding performance. Alternatively, they may simply
spend time and e¤ort to inuence the superiors decision, urging the superior to consider them for
promotion or even bribing him.14 If an employee repeatedly engages in such inuence activities,
it is conceivable that the other employees competing for the promotion will start to sabotage this
employee. This, in turn, may discourage the employee from trying to inuence the superiors
decision by unproductive means, implying a welfare gain.
2. In political competition, politicians may supply inaccurate information to voters or may
even tell lies to improve their chances of being elected. Exposing lies or inaccurate information
could be understood as a particular form of sabotage that may be seen as very useful from societys
perspective. Not only does this type of sabotage provide valuable information to voters so that
14Such inuence activities were studied by Milgrom (1988).
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they can make better voting decisions, but it also reduces the incentive to lie or provide inaccurate
information in the rst place.
5 Policies to restrict sabotage
A clear understanding of the occurrence and the consequences of sabotage allows one to design
appropriate policies to overcome those issues. In this section, we address policies that economists
have proposed as possible solutions to the problems related to sabotage. To understand these
policies fully, it is helpful to take a closer look at the contestantsoptimal sabotage activities. If
we assume that an interior solution to the contestantsmaximization problem exists and that the
payo¤ functions are strictly concave, optimal sabotage activity sij is characterized by the condition
@pi (e
; s)
@sij
w =
@ci (e

i ; s

i )
@sij
; (3)
which simply states that sij is chosen such that the marginal benet to increasing sij (in terms
of a higher probability of receiving the winners prize) equals the marginal cost of e¤ort. Hence,
policies that are aimed at tackling the sabotage problem a¤ect a contestants decision by either
reducing the marginal benet from sabotaging opponents or, similar to the famous argument by
Becker (1968), by increasing the (marginal) cost. We also discuss other policies besides these two
that may be implemented to restrict sabotage.
5.1 Policies that reduce the benets from sabotage
Let us begin with policies that are aimed at reducing contestantsbenet from sabotage. The most
obvious policy in this respect, proposed by Lazear (1989), is to narrow the di¤erence between the
winning and losing prizes. If this gap is reduced, contestants have less incentive to win the contest.
As a result, they are less willing to engage in costly sabotage.15 Formally, with a narrower prize
15As shown by Chen (2003), it is also conceivable that the level of sabotage does not depend on the prize spread
at all. However, this happens only under very restrictive assumptions about production and cost functions. See
Proposition 4 in his paper and the discussion thereafter.
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spread, the left-hand-side (LHS) of condition (3) becomes smaller and so must the right-hand-side
(RHS), i.e.,
@ci(ei ;si )
@sij
. Assuming ci to be strictly convex, this implies a decrease in sij . By the
same token, however, contestants are less willing to put forth productive e¤ort. Thus, the policy
comes at a cost to the contest organizer. Because of this cost, Drago and Turnbull (1991) propose
not organizing a tournament at all if sabotage is a serious threat (i.e., to set the prize spread
equal to zero) and to seek alternative ways of motivating the players to put forth productive e¤ort.
Bose et al. (2010) advance a similar argument. As explained before, however, experimental results
by Charness et al. (2014) suggest that sabotage may occur as long as information regarding the
players performance ranking is available, even if the monetary rewards do not depend on this
ranking.
The predictions concerning the e¤ects of prize spread on playersdecisions have found strong
support from empirical and experimental studies. Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014), for ex-
ample, analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the number of points awarded for a win in Spanish
football. They nd that teams react by increasing both the number of attackers and the number
of defenders (while reducing the number of midelders) in the starting lineup. They interpret this
observation not only as evidence of more vigorous productive e¤orts (attackers) but also of more
sabotage (defenders) in response to the change in incentive structure. In line with the latter argu-
ment, the authors also nd that the number of fouls committed increases after the change in the
prize structure.
Corral et al. (2010) conduct a similar analysis with data from the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996
seasons of the Spanish First Division Football League. Again, the e¤ects on sabotage activities
of the change in the winning teams league points from two to three are investigated. As the
reward increases, Corral et al. (2010) predict a rise in playersdefensive e¤orts and thus a greater
likelihood of a player being sent o¤ the pitch. They nd that when reward points increase, teams
in the winning position are more likely to sabotage and to have a player disqualied from the game.
Their results also suggest that when the goal di¤erence in a match becomes larger, the likelihood
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of a sending-o¤ generally is smaller.16
Laboratory experiments conducted to analyze the sabotage problem in contests conrm the
observation that sabotage levels increase in the prize spread (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2004, 2005,
2011; and Vandegrift and Yavas 2010). Contest organizers seem to understand the relationship
between prize spreads and sabotage levels. As a result, they widen prize spreads and prefer tour-
nament schemes to other incentive devices more often if sabotage is not feasible (Falk et al. 2008;
Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011).
A second method of reducing contestants benets from sabotage is to increase the number
of contestants. This possibility was rst described by Konrad (2000). The argument goes as
follows: if a player increases his productive e¤ort, he increases his own output and thereby the
probability of outperforming every single opponent. If, instead, he increases the level of sabotage
directed against a particular rival, he reduces that rivals output and, hence, he increases the
probability of outperforming that rival only. If the number of contestants rises, productive e¤orts
become relatively more attractive compared to sabotage activities, and the sabotage problem is
mitigated. Stated di¤erently, sabotage directed against player j by player i constitutes a public
good for all other contestants. This is because player i increases all other players(except j) winning
probabilities by sabotaging player j. Hence, the provision of the public good, i.e., sabotage, declines
when more players participate in the game.
To present this argument formally, recall that in many situations it is assumed that con-
testant i receives the winners prize if and only if his performance is the best overall, so that
pi = P (yi > max fy1; :::; yi 1; yi+1; :::; yNg). When worker i chooses greater productive e¤ort (i.e.,
when he increases ei), the term on the LHS of the inequality in parentheses increases, making it
more likely that yi exceeds any of the yj (j = 1; :::; N; j 6= i). Instead, when worker i decides to
sabotage worker j more than others (i.e., when he increases sij), yj declines and it becomes more
16This implies that a larger ex-post performance di¤erence reduces sabotage. That result is in line with the study
by Brown and Chowdhury (2014), who nd less sabotage in horseracing when the ex-ante ability di¤erence is large.
Overall, these studies suggest more sabotage between contestants with similar (ex-ante or ex-post) abilities.
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likely that yi exceeds yj . The probability with which yi exceeds any of the other contestantsperfor-
mances, however, is not a¤ected. It immediately follows that the larger the number of contestants
competing for the prize, the greater is the benet from increasing ei relative to increasing sij .
Amegashie (2012) employs sabotage in a rent-seeking model in a di¤erent fashion. Similar to
Harbring et al. (2007), he introduces a two-player Tullock contest with two stages. In the rst
stage, the players can expend costly resources to increase the marginal cost of their rival. In the
second stage, given their marginal costs, they expend e¤ort in a standard Tullock contest. The
di¤erence between this model and the majority of the relevant literature is that the sabotage does
not a¤ect the e¤ort of the rival directly; instead, it a¤ects the rivals performance by increasing
his cost of exerting e¤ort. Amegashies results conrm the idea that sabotage is less relevant in
larger contests with many participants. While closed form solutions for the general case of n players
are impossible to derive, numerical simulations show that in large contests, players do not expend
positive sabotage e¤ort.
In spite of the importance of this theoretically robust argument, little evidence exists on the
e¤ects of the number of contestants on sabotage activities. Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) nd
that tournament size does not a¤ect sabotage activity. However, in their experiment, sabotage
reduces the output of all of the opponents. As a result, the public-good problem outlined earlier
disappears in such a setting.
Finally, Chen (2005) considers a specic form of contest: one in which the contestants are
employees who compete for promotion to a vacancy in a higher tier of their rms hierarchy. He
shows that the rm may want to consider external candidates for the vacancy if the internal
candidates perform poorly. If external candidates are admitted, the return to productive e¤ort
compared to sabotage increases for the internal contestants. The reason is simple and is related
to the arguments concerning contest size. By exerting productive e¤ort, an employee improves his
chances of outperforming both internal and external candidates. Sabotage, however, can be directed
only against internal competitors. Hence, if the rm considers external candidates for promotion,
internal competitors substitute productive e¤ort for sabotage. Formally, this argument could be
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substantiated by writing pi as pi = P (yi > max fy1; :::; yi 1; yi+1; :::; yN ; yg), where y denotes a
xed performance level that cannot be inuenced by the contestants.
5.2 Policies that increase the cost of sabotage
The most obvious policy to raise the (marginal) cost of sabotage,
@ci(ei ;si )
@sij
, is to increase the
punishment when sabotage is detected. In many contests, the maximum punishment that the
contest organizer can inict on a contestant is to strip him of the prize he had won. In a setting
of cheating that is analytically similar to that of sabotage, Curry and Mongrain (2009) consider
such a situation and investigate whether stripped prizes should be re-awarded to other contestants.
They demonstrate that re-awarded prizes mitigate the wrongdoing. In the context of sabotage,
if prizes are re-awarded, a contestant can expect to improve his relative ranking and to obtain a
larger prize if other contestants whose sabotage activities have been detected are disqualied. By
engaging in sabotage himself, the contestant risks missing the opportunity to receive a larger prize
"for free", making sabotage a costly activity.
Several other policies that aim at increasing the cost of sabotage have been discussed in the
literature. Lazear (1989) proposes separating contestants spatially to make it more di¢ cult for
them to sabotage each other. Consider the example of a rm that organizes a contest to motivate
employees. Employees from di¤erent locations would nd it harder to a¤ect their opponents
performances than employees working in the same building or o¢ ce.
When the contest organizer is able to inuence contestant eld ex ante, he may choose to let in
only those players for whom sabotaging others is relatively costly. Players may incur some form of
psychological cost while sabotaging others and this cost may vary across players. Similarly, players
who su¤er from relative deprivation or envy when being worse o¤ than others incur lower costs
of sabotage because sabotage reduces the probability of feeling deprived or envious (Kräkel 2000;
Grund and Sliwka 2005). The contest organizer thus should admit only those players who do not
su¤er from relative deprivation or envy. Unfortunately, it is often di¢ cult to observe the specic
characteristics of a player, especially their states of mind. Furthermore, players do not have an
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incentive to self-select into contests that are designed for their types (Lazear 1989). Mechanisms
such as assessment centers may help to screen contestants, but those assessments will be far from
perfect.
Balafoutas et al. (2012) report the results of a eld study of the e¤ects of sabotage costs.
They rely on data from two consecutive judo world championships in 2007 and 2009 to analyze the
e¤ects of the cost structure on the use of sabotage. They specify productive activities (attacking
strategies) and sabotage activities (defensive strategies which are often penalized) in judo. A
change in judos rules in 2009 allowed the players to commit one act of sabotagewithout penalty,
hence reducing the cost of sabotage. Balafoutas et al. (2012) nd that, as expected, the reduction
in cost increased the total number of sabotage acts. Hence, it is suggested that when it is possible
to monitor sabotage and impose costs upon it, a heavy penalty cost should be imposed.
Laboratory experiments have found that contestants retaliate when sabotaged and that the
threat of retaliation deters players from sabotaging others in the rst place (Harbring et al. 2007;
Vandegrift and Yavas 2010). Retaliation thus acts as a type of additional indirect cost of sabotage.
Of course, players must learn the identity of saboteurs to be able to retaliate against them. The
contest should therefore be transparent in the sense that sabotage decisions should be observable
publicly. Moreover, players should meet each other more than once to be able to retaliate. Retali-
ation, however, may not just benet the contest organizer; it may also be used against him. If he
treats the contestants badly, they may decide to sabotage each other to reduce the output that the
contest organizer receives. This type of behavior is observed by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005).
They nd that sabotage is more frequent if the organizer himself sets low prizes rather than if these
low prizes are determined exogenously. Presumably, the psychological costs of sabotaging others
are higher if the contestants were treated well by the contest organizer than if they were not. An
immediate take-away is that the organizer should be generous toward the contestants to prevent
them from engaging in sabotage. Finally, experimental results from Bolle et al. (2014) show that if
retaliation itself can be retaliated against, then players might engage only in destructive behavior,
i.e., retaliation against a saboteur might escalate the execution of destructive behavior in an upward
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spiral over time and lead to the worst possible outcome. Hence, the designer will need to be very
careful about allowing retaliatory actions.
The contest organizer may instead wish to a¤ect the timing of sabotage decisions. Kräkel
(2005) considers a model in which players decide to help or sabotage each other rst and, after
having observed those decisions, choose their productive e¤orts. He shows that a contestant may
even want to help his opponent to make subsequent competition less equal and thus less intense.
In other words, sabotaging the opponent would yield a close competition in productive e¤orts
and, accordingly, raise the cost of productive e¤ort. To lower this cost, players may abstain from
sabotaging the opponent. Of course, the reduction in sabotage comes at a cost to the contest
organizer because, contrary to the contestants, he su¤ers from the reduction in productive e¤orts.
5.3 Other policies
Policies to restrict sabotage exist that do not fall into either of the two categories described above.
Brown and Chiang (2008), for instance, consider the tournament setting of Lazear (1989) and
allow the players to form coalitions. It is assumed that positive externalities exist, implying that a
coalitions probability of winning depends on its size. If such externalities are su¢ ciently salient,
an equilibrium sub-coalition forms and sabotage activity declines overall. For a su¢ ciently small
externality, a grand coalition exists and sabotage does not occur at all. Understandably, this
type of policy may be feasible only for some specic situations and not for sports or workplace
environments.
Given previous studies of sabotage, however, the most important policy may be restricting the
provision of information to the contestants. Gürtler et al. (2013) argue that many of the outlined
problems rely on the possibility of players observing each others talents or past performances.
Hence, the contest organizer should try to keep this type of information secret. If, for instance, the
organizer does not reveal intermediate performance information to the contestants in a dynamic
contest, they do not know which player has a lead and cannot direct their sabotage e¤orts at this
particular player. As a result, incentives to expend productive e¤ort in early rounds of the contest
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are reinstated. Using experimental data, Gürtler et al. (2013) nd that this type of restrictive
information policy works in the sense that productive e¤orts in early rounds of dynamic contests
increase.
There are some limits to this argument, though. In some settings, the tournament organizer
simply is unable to fully restrict the ow of information. In repeated contestants, for example, the
winners of the early rounds are announced publicly and so become common knowledge. It is then
easy to infer that the winners were the high-performing contestants so that in future contests, it
will be di¢ cult to hide information about who the top performers are. A possible way to mitigate
this problem is to introduce new contestants with unknown ability periodically. As Chen (2003)
argues, including contestants from outside of an organization may reduce the likelihood of sabotage.
A further possibility for tackling the problems described earlier is to change the prize structure.
Suppose that a single loser prize is awarded, but the contest o¤ers N   1 winning prizes. Then,
pi is given by pi = P (yi > min fy1; :::; yi 1; yi+1; :::; yNg), and the contestants prefer to sabotage
players of low ability to make sure not to end up in the last position (Yumoto 2003). As a result,
very able contestants are willing to participate in such a contest. Moreover, in dynamic contests,
players have an incentive to exert high productive e¤ort in early stages to avoid lagging behind and
being sabotaged harshly.
6 Conclusion
Sabotage is the exertion of destructive e¤ort toward rivals with the intention of reducing their
likelihood of winning a contest. Although sabotage is observed in various day-to-day situations,
such as sports, on-the-job promotions, war, and rent seeking, and, moreover, a sizeable body of
literature on this topic exists, that literature has not yet been thoroughly reviewed. This article
lls the gap, focusing on the economics of sabotage in contests.
Both theoretical and applied studies agree on several points regarding sabotage. Sabotage is
positively related to the value of the prize value to be won and negatively to the cost of engaging
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in sabotage activities. Usually, saboteurs are more likely to target their ablest rivals and to do so
more frequently. Circumstances exist in which sabotage, whether by one player or a coalition of
them, o¤sets the gains from investing productive e¤ort into a contest. That is because sabotage
directly reduces the contests collective output, discourages players from exerting productive e¤orts,
and imposes negative externalities on third parties. Sabotage may be limited in several ways,
viz. increasing the cost of sabotage, concealing information regarding contestants abilities or
performances, increasing the number of participants, and not leveling the playing-eld among
contestants with asymmetric abilities.
Sabotage has been studied extensively in the context of promotion tournaments. However, the
sabotage problem may be relevant even if rms do not rely on tournaments to select employees
to move up the organizations hierarchy. In many situations, rms nd it in their best interest to
o¤er wage contracts to their employees that depend on the employeesrelative performances. Such
wage contracts may, for instance, be optimal if individual performances are positively correlated
and employees are risk-averse, so, in that case, relative performance evaluation (RPE) reduces the
income risk that employees face (Holmström and Milgrom 1990). If an employees wage depends on
his performance relative to that of others, the incentive structure is similar to that in a tournament
and, hence, sabotage is an issue. Sabotage may occur even if workers collaborate in teams (Auriol
et al. 2002; Bose et al. 2010; Kräkel and Müller 2012).
Some interesting and relevant areas exist in which investigations relating to sabotage have yet
to be conducted. The theoretical literature still needs to explore the issues of sabotage in contests
with multiple prizes, in super games, and in dynamic/sequential games. The literature on issues
relevant to contest design, such as seeding, prize distribution, or entry does not yet include sabotage.
This is also true for contests that generate externalities such as networks, social preferences, and
identities. Few attempts have been made to analyze sabotage in groups and in coalitions. Defensive
measures against sabotage activities and the corresponding welfare implications likewise have not
yet been studied. Most of the studies consider the normal e¤orts in contests as welfare enhancing
and sabotage as welfare reducing. If, as considered in Section 4.3, contest e¤orts are considered to
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be welfare reducing, then the corresponding behavioral implications will demand di¤erent welfare
analyses. More fundamentally, each and every model involving sabotage possibilities assumes the
overall probability of winning a prize to be xed (at 1, for instance). However, in other cases,
such as patent races, advertising, and some sporting events, this does not need to be true. An
area of literature exists that addresses attack-and-defense strategies (see Grossman and Kim 1995
for an example), the analytical techniques of which often are the same as those used in analyzing
sabotage. Comparisons of those two literatures still are pending.
Current empirical evidence on sabotage activities mostly comes from laboratory experiments,
and the literature itself is also quite narrow. Issues such as sabotage in network games, the in-
teraction between risk and sabotage, sabotage and contest design currently are almost untouched.
Interesting issues also relate to post-contest sabotage in multi-stage or dynamic contests. Whether
a player chooses to sabotage the opponent after a contest ends to reduce future competition is an
empirical question and should be investigated. The body of eld evidence regarding sabotage is
not large, and most of the evidence is from sports contests. It will be useful to extend such investi-
gations to areas other than sports. As discussed earlier, the welfare e¤ects of sabotage in market or
political environments remain to be studied and measured. Most theoretical and applied research
on sabotage focuses on the e¤ectsof sabotage or the material reason for sabotage. However,
because the nature of the act itself is fundamentally behavioral, it is very important to observe the
theory through the lens of behavioral economists (for an example, see Mui 1995). Finally, to date,
no eld experiments on sabotage exist beyond the world of sports. Hence, opportunities to extend
the literature in this area are both broad and deep.
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